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ABSTRACT
This study attempts to identify to what extent long-term
contracting is feasible by the Department of Defense (DoD).
It was primarily accomplished by examining the long-term
contracting literature base and through surveys and follow-up
telephone interviews with individuals from private industry
and with individuals from DoD. The surveys and interviews
were conducted in order to specifically identify and
characterize any barriers which may be restricting DoD's
ability to use a long-term contracting approach; and if so, to
determine how these barriers can best be overcome, by
comparing DoD's long-term contracting practices to the long-
term contracting practices of private industry.
The research concludes that although DoD does face greater
barriers (primarily due to Government procurement practices
and regulations concerning competition and budgeting) than
commercial buying organizations; there are enough contracting
types and arrangements, as well as special contracting methods
available which allows those DoD activities, which so desire,




A. BACKGROUND .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 1
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 2
C. RESEARCH QUESTION . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 2
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS .. .. . .. 3
E. METHODOLOGY .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 4
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 4
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. BACKGROUND .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 6
B. ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTING 16
C. INFLUENCES ON LONG-TERM CONTRACTING . .. . .. 22
D. LONG-TERM CONTRACTING IN THE GOVERNM4ENT .. . .. 30
E. SUMMARY .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 46
III. QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS
A. BACKGROUND .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 48
B. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS . .. .. .. .. .. . .. 51
C. SUMMARY .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 70
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. BACKGROUND .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 73
B. CONCLUSIONS .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. 73
C. RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ..... ........ 83
APPENDIX A: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION ............ 84
APPENDIX B: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE ....... ........... 85
APPENDIX C: PRIMARY PRODUCTS OF PARTICIPATING COMPANIES . 89
REFERENCES . .......................... 90




In this period of austere budgeting in the Department of
Defense (DoD) it is increasingly important that money
appropriated for procurement is spent wisely and results in
timely delivery of quality products at reasonable prices. One
way to accomplish this objective is through effective source
selection. A very important tool available to individuals
involved in this process is the use of long-term contracting.
Although this concept has been proven successful by private
industry, it appears to fly in the face of traditional
Government procurement. One would think that current
Government contracting practices and regulations concerning
competition and budgeting would impede the Government's
ability to use a long-term approach to the procurement of
goods and services.
In spite of these potential barriers, many Government
agencies are attempting to use this method when it makes sense
to do so from an economical or quality standpoint. For
instance, DoD, as a result of rising costs, budgetary
pressures, and reduced quantity requirements has been
exploring the use of long-term contracting over the past few
years.
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The objective of the thesis is to determine to what extent
current Government procurement practices and regulations
concerning competition and budgeting actually affect DoD's
ability to utilize a long-term contracting approach and to
identify any successful long-term contracting "lessons
learned" that can be used by DoD activities. In order to
accomplish this objective, the thesis is designed to examine
certain issues surrounding the use of long-term contracting by
both private industry and the Government and to apply this
information in a way that will be beneficial to DoD, as well
as possibly other Government contracting activities.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
Given the preceding objective, the following primary
research question was posed during this study: To what extent
is long-term contracting by DoD feasible (considering current
Government procurement practices and regulations concerning
competition and budgeting)?
Subsidiary research questions are as follows:
1) What is long-term contracting?
2) What are the advantages and disadvantages of long-term
contracts?
3) What are the major influences on long-term contracting?
4) In the Government, what are the long-term contract types
available, long-term contract techniques available, and
general impediments to long-term contracting?
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5) What types of goods and services, contract types and
pricing arrangements, incentives, and unique contracting
arrangements lend themselves to long-term contracting?
6) What are the most common characteristics of successful
long-term contracts?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ABSUMPTIONS
This thesis is divided into two main parts. The first
part reviews and analyzes long-term contracting from a broad
perspective. In particular, discussing what it is, its
purpose, and its history; looking at its benefits and
drawbacks; reviewing the influences on it; and exploring its
general applicability in the Government.
The second part specifically focuses on the identification
and characterization of barriers which may be restricting
DoD's ability to use a long-term contracting approach; and if
so, how these barriers can best be overcome, by comparing
DoD's long-term contracting practices to long-term contracting
practices of private industry (specifically companies that
specialize in both commercial and defense related work).
The thesis is limited by the participation of a relatively
small number of private buying organizations. The sample size
used (130 companies) is probably not large enough to be able
to infer conclusions about all American businesses. However,
the sample is a good representation of companies that
specialize in both commercial and defense related work.
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It is assumed that the reader is familiar with Government
procurement practices and policies, as well as with basic laws
and regulations that affect Government procurement (e.g.,
Competition in contracting Act, Federal Acquisition
Regulation, etc.).
Z. METHODOLOGY
The methodology that the researcher employed consists of
the following steps: (1) review of pertinent literature, (2)
survey of senior procurement officials working for companies
involved in both commercial and defense related work, (3)
survey of senior procurement officials in major DoD buying
offices, (4) follow-up telephone interviews with selected
individuals from private industry, and (5) follow-up telephone
interviews with selected individuals from DoD.
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized into four chapters. The first
chapter is an introduction to the thesis.
Chapter II presents the findings of the comprehensive
literature review conducted. The discussion focuses on the
information concerning long-term contracting which the
researcher discussed in Section D.
Chapter III presents the data collected for this research
through surveys, follow-up telephone interviews, and
4
literature provided by participants in this study. An
interpretation and analysis of the data is also presented.
Chapter IV provides the researcher's conclusions and





During approximately the past ten years there has been a
fundamental change taking place in the way purchasing is being
conducted. Recently, logistical concepts such as just-in-
time, material requirements planning, early supplier
involvement, best value, zero-defects, win-win negotiating,
and total quality management have caused organizations to re-
examine purchasing's role in the organization, as well as to
re-examine traditional purchasing methods. In oversimplified
terms, these changes add up to a movement in which purchasing
is becoming more and more a "materials management profession."
In the past, contracting personnel tended to be
compartmentalized in an organization and were usually just
responsible for providing material and services in a timely
manner at the lowest purchased cost. Today, however, as
materials become more expensive and logistical methods more
scientific, contracting personnel are assuming greater
responsibility for improving the overall efficiency and
effectiveness of organizations. In this environment,
purchasing officials must work closely with other departments
in order to maximize the organization's goals. For private
industry this may mean profitability, competitiveness, or
increased market share. For public organizations, such as
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DoD, it may mean the reliability and effectiveness of a
particular weapon system.
Nevertheless, no matter what the goals are, both the
public and private sectors have discovered that supplier
involvement can assist the organization significantly in
meeting its goals and for implementing the logistical
concepts discussed in the first paragraph. As a result,
contracting professionals are turning to long-term contracting
methods in order to buy suppliers' expertise, as well as
suppliers' products. For example, a study by the Defense
Systems Management College 1988-89 Military Research Fellows
entitled, "Using Commercial Practices in DoD Acquisition: A
Page from Industry's Playbook," found that companies are
adopting more cooperative relationships with their suppliers.
(Ref. l:p. 59) Specifically, they found that every company
interviewed had partnerships with suppliers to some degree.
In addition, Purchasing, a journal of the commercial
purchasing profession, reported in a 1988 article, (Ref. 2:p.
23] that 67 percent of companies surveyed had long-term
relationships with suppliers (Figure 2.1), while a follow-up
survey in 1992, (Ref. 3:p. 50] found that this percentage




Figure 2.1; 1988 Percentage of Long-Term Relationships
1992
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Figure 2.2; 1992 Percentage of Long-Term Relationships
I. What is Long-Term Contracting
During the course of the literature review, the
researcher was unable to find an exact definition for long-
term contracting. Nonetheless, the researcher did discover
the following characteristics of long-term contracting which
appear universally accepted:
* Long-Term Formal Relationships
* Partnerships
* Winner-Take-All Contract Awards
* Strategic Source Planning
a. Long-Term Formal Relationships
The first characteristic of long-term contracting
involves the establishment of a formal buyer/seller
relationship longer than traditionally expected (usually
longer than one year) in a normal competitive environment.
This contracting approach is intended to cultivate a
buyer/seller relationship which enhances the level of product
or service quality expected by the buyer and delivered by the
seller. Without some sort of formal relationship, many
vendors are unwilling to obligate a set portion of their
output without assurances of future purchases. For example,
another Purchasing survey found that 61 percent of firms who
say they have long-term relationships, have formal agreements.
Of that group, 64 percent have something written and signed,
but say it is non-contractual; 36 percent have taken the
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additional step and signed long-term contracts. (Ref. 4:p.
22)
The researcher believes that an even greater
percentage of firms involved in long-term relationships will
require formal written terms in the future. The case of the
Texas Extrusion Corporation should convince any doubters of
the need for a formal agreement. [Ref. 5:p. 33] Shortly
after Texas Extrusion had agreed to refit its entire plant to
the needs of its buyer, the buyer opted to discontinue the
product for which Texas Extrusion provided the material. And
as a direct result of this incident, Texas Extrusion fell into
bankruptcy. Texas Extrusion had a long-term agreement, but
unfortunately did not have any actual formal written terms.
b. Partnerships
Long-term contracting relationships are also
characterized by cooperation and mutual dependence, or a
partnership between the buyer and the seller. Thus, a great
deal of sharing takes place between the parties. Usually this
involves not only sharing production scheduling information
and technical know-how, but also the sharing of cost
information.
At the heart of this relationship, according to
buyers who use it, is the assumption of quid pro quo. In
particular, buyers and suppliers give something to get
something. Buyers typically make specific demand guarantees
to their suppliers and the suppliers ensure that a certain
10
portion of their output is reserved to meet the buyer's
requirements. [Ref. 3:p. 23]
c. Winner-Take-All Contract Awards
Initially competition is sought for the first
procurement; however, future awards (in private industry) are
often made to the seller without seeking additional
competition.' In this winner-take-all arrangement, the seller
normally becomes a single source of supply to the buyer. With
single sourcing a buying firm has elected to purchase all of
its requirements from one vendor. This should not be confused
with the concept of sole sourcing. Sole sourcing generally
refers to the use of one source because, in a practical sense,
only one source exists due to exclusive design, location, etc.
A side effect of these arrangements, is that organizations
have begun to consciously reduce their supplier base. [Ref.
6:p. 19]
The primary advantage of winner-take-all contract
awards with fewer, higher quality vendors, is because these
type of relationships can often lead to improved end-item
quality. For instance, studies have shown that most U.S.
manufacturers purchase more than half of their component
parts. As such, the quality of these incoming parts can
significantly affect the quality of outgoing products. (Ref.
7:p. 76]
'This is not true in Government procurement. Government
statutes generally always require competition.
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d. Strategic Source Planning
Another characteristic of long-term contracting is
strategic source planning. Strategic source planning is
critical to the success of long-term contracting.
Partnerships are much different in nature than traditional
buyer-seller relationships, and thus require the consideration
of additional factors in supplier selection. (Ref. 8:p. 8]
Specifically, buyers who award long-term contracts place a
great deal of effort in analyzing what types of materials and
which vendors would be suitable for this approach.
One way that firms are measuring vendors'
performance is through supplier rating programs. A 1991
survey reported by Purchasing magazine shows that suppliers
are being subjected to formal and detailed monthly or
quarterly performance surveys on everything from product
quality and delivery schedules to receipt of technical data
sheets and timely billing paperwork. [Ref. 9:p. 92] At the
time this survey was conducted, nearly two-thirds of the major
manufacturing firms in the country had supplier rating
programs. In addition, the survey concluded that a vast
majority of formal rating programs currently in place will be
even tougher by mid-decade. Selected results of this survey
are shown in Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.
12
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Figure 2.5; Types of Goods and Services Being Rated
2. Purpose of Long-Term Contracting
The primary purpose of long-term contracting is to
obtain benefits by both the buyer and the seller, which would
not be available with a traditional or short-term
relationship. The 1988 Purchasing survey cited earlier, for
example, found that 85 percent of the buyers who use some form
of long-term relationships with suppliers believe it met their
goals of reduced inventory, cost control, dependable supply
levels, and reduced lead times. [Ref. 2:p. 23]
3. History of Long-Term Contracting
The practice of relying on one source of supply began
years ago as sole sourcing. At that time, the use of only one
supplier was not a conscious managerial strategy, but rather
14
was a result of various factors. These factors included
geographic proximity to suppliers, inadequate transportation
methods, existing monopolies, proprietary products, inflexible
design specifications, and an absence of alternative sources.
[Ref. 10:p. 106]
After World War II, in the interest of quality, Dr. W.
Edwards Deming recommended that firms reduce the number of
vendors used. He concluded that having more than one supplier
for a particular product only increased the inherent amount of
variation in the product. Although U.S. or European firms did
not embrace this concept at first; Japanese firms did. 2
Incentives for entering into single source
relationships have changed over the years. Originally, single
sourcing was used as a sort of reward for the firm which
submitted the lowest bid in a procurement. Typically, the
lowest bidder received the benefits of being the exclusive
supplier and as such also developed an advantage over other
suppliers for future work. By today's standards these
arrangements would be short in duration, but were nevertheless
aggressively sought by vendors. (Ref. 6:p. 20]
Today, single sourcing usually implies much more. A
longer term relationship and an emphasis on life-cycle cost
reduction and quality improvements are the major differences.
2More will be said about Dr. Deming's influence on long-
term contracting later in this chapter.
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Ironically, now it is typically the buyers who aggressively
seek long-term relationships. [Ref. 6:p. 20]
B. ADVANTAGES/DISADVANTAGES OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTING
As previously discussed, the purpose of long-term
contracting is to obtain advantages by both the buyer and the
seller, which would not be available in traditional purchasing
arrangements. The traditional method is one that encouraged
short-term competitive-based purchasing. Under this method,
a buying organization tries to maintain as many sources as
possible for each of its procured materials. This strategy is
designed to ensure alternate sources of supply in case of
supply disruptions (e.g., labor strikes, raw material
shortages, and natural disasters). Additionally, competition
is used to allow the market place to play an important role in
determining the prices of goods and services. [Ref. 6:p. 20]
1. Advantages
Although there are many advantages to traditional
purchasing methods, in many cases even greater benefits can
accrue when a buyer and seller work together in a cooperative
long-term relationship. Five specific universally accepted
advantages of long-term contracting which the researcher found
in the course of the literature review are:
* Improved Problem Solving
* Reduction of Life-Cycle Costs
* Improved Quality
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* Improved Resource Planning
* Increased Investment
a. Improved Problem Solving
Improved problem solving is the first significant
advantage to both the buyer and the seller in long-term
contracting arrangements. Such a relationship allows the
buyer to learn more about the costs, difficulties, and the
needs of the supplier. On the other hand, the vendor learns
more about how the buyer uses its product, and develops a more
complete understanding of the buyer's problems and needs.
[Ref. 6:p. 21] Suppliers can be especially helpful in the
area of product design. A 1984 study indicated that when
suppliers are involved early in the buyer's design process,
they can apply their expertise in nine areas. (Ref. 11:p. 67]
These areas are: (1) material specifications, (2) tolerances,
(3) standardization, (4) order sizes, (5) process changes in
supplier's manufacturing, (6) packaging, (7) inventory, (8)
transportation, and (9) assembly changes in buyer's plants.
b. Reduction of Life-Cycle Costs
Another major advantage of long-term contracting
arrangements to a buyer and a seller involves the reduction of
life-cycle costs. Long-term contracting arrangements, for
instance, enabled Xerox to reduce copier costs 10 percent from
1980 through 1985. (Ref. 12:p. 45] Life-cycle costs are all
costs incurred for a product beginning at its design and
ending with its disposal. Specifically, life-cycle costing
17
seeks to determine the total cost of ownership rather than
just the initial price of product. (Ref. 13:p. 328]
There are many reasons why life-cycle costs for a
product may be reduced under long-term contracting
arrangements. From a buyer's viewpoint, one reason proposed
by Dr. Mark Treleven (a noted expert), is that the buyer's
production costs will be reduced because adjustments are no
longer necessary when changing from a part supplied by one
vendor to the same part supplied by another vendor. [Ref.
6:p. 20] Besides reducing actual production costs, buyers may
also be able to reduce their sales and order processing costs,
material handling costs, and inventory holding costs with a
long-term contractual approach.
Long-term contracts also normally decrease the
production costs of suppliers. As a result of the increased
volume associated with long-term contracts, vendors' fixed
costs can be spread over a larger number of products,
resulting in lower individual unit costs. Additionally, the
increased volume may mean that a vendor can drop some of its
less profitable accounts.
c. Improved Quality
A very important side benefit of long-term
contracting to both parties is increased communication.
According to Dr. Treleven, this increased communication
ultimately leads to less rejected shipments and rework. For
instance, he says, "When quality problems do develop, the
18
buyer is able to provide useful information about the
difficulties, thus facilitating the prompt initiation of
corrective action." (Ref. 6:p. 22]
In addition, a supplier with a long-term contract
is probably more likely to be innovative or to modify
production processes than a supplier with a short-term
contract. (Ref. 14: p. 64]
d. Improved Resource Planning
Improved resource planning is also frequently
cited as a common benefit of long-term contracting. To a
seller, this typically means a level of guaranteed devand over
an extended period of time. This guaranteed demand, in turn,
enables a seller to reduce its administrative burden and to
stabilize its productions runs. Sellers involved in long-term
relationships normally are also able to provide greater
delivery dependability, reduce buyer administrative lead time,
and are more responsive to changes proposed by the buyer.
e. Long-Term Investment
A final commonly cited advantage of long-term
contracting is that in many cases suppliers are more willing
and able to invest in new plant and equipment, as well as R&D
efforts when future sales volumes are known. Increased
investment assists the supplier in improving his production
capabilities and makes him/her more competitive in the
industry. Money spent in R&D and capital investment also
allows a supplier to propose technologically current, cost-
19
effective, and high-quality solutions to a buying firm'e
needs. (Ref. 13:p. 180]
Unfortunately, traditional purchasing methods do
not provide the assurance of future sales or return on
investment normally needed by sellers before they will make
long-term investment decisions. [Ref. 15:p. 6]
2. Disadvantages
Although the researcher has mentioned many of the
benefits of long-term contracting, it is impossible to get an
objective "big picture" perspective of this procurement method
without also looking at its drawbacks. Two of its main
disadvantages are:
* Loss of Competition
* Complete Dependency on the Other Party
a. Loss of Competition
As previously mentioned, a primary reason for
entering into long-term contractual relationships is to reduce
life-cycle costs. However, in some situations long-term
contracting can actually increase costs. The absence of
competitive cost pressures is one of the major concerns of
most buyers when considering single sourcing. From the
seller's side, a primary consideration is getting a fair price
as well. In a relatively free economic system, two key
factors determine the price a vendor is able to achieve: (1)
the cost of production and distribution, and (2) the market
20
factors of supply, demand, and pricing behavior of
competitors. In a single sourcing environment, the focus is
on cost; market factors play a secondary role. As such, a
vendor with a strong bargaining position (e.g., only supplier)
may actually have to charge less with a long-term contract
than under a short-term contractual relationship. (Ref. 6:p.
22]
Another reason for entering into long-term
contracts is to improve quality and service. Again, however,
in some situations sole sourcing may lead to a decrease in
quality. Without competition, but with assurances of a stable
future demand, a supplier may become complacent. According to
the authors of Purchasing and Materials Management:
"Complacency can result in less than satisfactory levels of
service, quality problems, and a failure to maintain
technological accuracy." [Ref. 13:p. 184]
b. Complete Dependency on the Other Party
Complete Dependency on the Other Party - One of
the benefits of long-term contracts is that buyers are
guaranteed a steady flow of material and sellers are
guaranteed a steady demand. This relationship is fine as long
as there are no disruptions to production. However, in times
of emergencies a buyer may be at the mercy of its supplier.
For example, the Saturn Division of General Motors recently
had to stop production of its cars within 48 hours, when their
sole supplier of an automobile body part experienced a labor
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strike. From the supplier's point of view, the main concern
is just reversed. Dr. Treleven, for instance, says, "What
would happen to a vendor if its source of demand incurred some
type of catastrophe or, for whatever reason, discontinued the
product for which the vendor is supplying parts?" [Ref. 6:p.
23]
Additionally, there are other dependency drawbacks
from a supplier's perspective. One such problem is that it is
not unusual for a few customers to make up a large percentage
of a supplier's business. As such, the loss of just one
customer can financially devastate a supplier. Another
problem often cited concerns the opportunity cost a supplier
may experience with a long-term contract. When a supplier
enters into a long-term contract, it automatically obligates
a portion of its capacity for the duration of the contract.
Consequently, a supplier may be giving up profits from
potential new business that may have been possible had not its
capacity already been allocated. Loss of supplier identity is
also a problem concerning long-term contracting. Although
suppliers like close knit relationships, they also want to
retain some form of independence and separate identity. [Ref.
16:p. 22]
C. INFUIUNCR OF LONG-TUI COT'NRACTING
In the introduction of this chapter the researcher
mentioned various logistical concepts which are encouraging
22
the use of long-term contracting. Unfortunately the
researcher is not able, due to the scope of this thesis, to
adequately cover every logistical concept influencing the use
of long-term contracting. Nevertheless, the researcher will
focus on three of its major influences. They are: (1) best
value, (2) inventory management and distribution systems, and
(3) total quality management.
1. Best Value
Best value involves making purchasing decisions on
other than a price-only basis. Essentially this concept is
the application of common sense to the buying process. (Ref.
17:p. 268] Other factors besides price which are important
determinants of a best value purchasing decision include life-
cycle costs, schedule, service, quality, reliability,
technical ability, and financial stability. The objective of
buyers who use best value is neither lowest price nor maximum
performance, but rather a balance between these factors and
the other more subjective criteria which the researcher has
mentioned. For example, in the course of satisfying a
purchase request for a coffee cup, a buyer has received two
proposals; one is for a paper cup and the other is for a
ceramic cup. The price of the paper cup is $1.00 and the
price of the ceramic cup is $2.00. Both cups can satisfy the
customers requirement; nonetheless, if price was the only
factor considered, the paper cup would be purchased over the
ceramic one. But since the paper cup can only be used once
23
before disposal it might not be the best value for a
particular buyer.
One major disadvantage of this concept is that the
factors and their relative weights involved in determining
best value for one purchasing decision may not be applicable
to another purchasing decision. (Ref. 17:p. 268]
Fortunately, in many cases, long-term contracting can assist
a buyer in making a sound purchasing decision under a best
value approach. This is because long-term contracting
arrangements encourage suppliers to put greater emphasis on
other factors besides price. As stated earlier, suppliers in
long-term contractual relationships are more likely to share
their technological ability, improve quality, offer better
service, enhance performance, and reduce life-cycle costs.
2. Inventory Management and Distribution Systems
Another very important factor which has significantly
encouraged the long-term contracting is the increased use of
scientific inventory management and distribution systems by
both the private and public sectors. Additionally, in many of
these inventory management and distribution systems, long-term
contractual relationships actually play a vital role in their
success. The researcher will discuss and analyze two
inventory management and distribution systems which have had
the greatest impact on long-term contracting. They are:
* Material Requirements Planning (MRP)
* Just-In-Time Production Planning (JIT)
24
a. Material Requirements Planning
Although in the past few years, users have found
that with some refinement MRP can be used for scheduling,
financial planning, and simulation, it was originally designed
to plan and control manufacturing inventories such as raw
materials, components, and sub-assemblies. Under this system,
the quantity required and reorder point for these items are
dependent on the production needs and ultimately the demand of
an end item. A refrigerator door, for instance, is a
dependent demand item in the production of a refrigerator.
(Ref. 13:p. 421]
In practice, quantity requirements and purchase
requests are normally accomplished by computer. Although
details of the software operation may vary, generally
speaking, the MRP system works as follows: It takes the
master production schedule output for a given product and
calculates precisely the specific part and component
requirements for that product during the given period of
operation. Since a given part often is used In more than one
finished product, the process is then repeated for all
products. Next, all requirements for a given part are added
to obtain the total sum required during the given period of
operation. After a part's requirements for the operating
period are calculated, the computer automatically compares
these requirements with the inventory balance, considering
outstanding orders scheduled for receipt to determine whether
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a new order needs to be placed. When operating properly, the
MRP system will reduce inventory investment, improve work
flow, reduce the shortage of materials and components, and
help achieve more reliable delivery schedules. [Ref. 13:p.
422)
However, the use of MRP necessitates greater
flexibility, reliability, and closer relationships between the
buyer and seller. Purchase requests are also generated more
frequently and for smaller quantities than under manual
material control systems. Additionally, because of the weekly
updating of most MRP systems, demand frequently changes and
often on short notice. Unfortunately traditional purchasing
methods are normally too expensive and inflexible for MRP.
Thus, many organizations with MRP systems utilize long-term
contracting procedures. In particular, organizations with a
MRP system, normally establish annual or long-term contracts
with a few selected suppliers--and then place an order against
the contract via telephone or fax, as the production operation
requires. (Ref. 13:p. 432]
b. Just-In-Time Production Planning
JIT is a system, refined by the Japanese, that
encourages the elimination of waste in time and resources
during the production of material while also improving product
quality. The fundamental principle of JIT is to produce the
right units in the right quantities at the right time. With
JIT, units are produced only when needed. Ideally, the number
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of parts produced or purchased at any one time should just be
enough to produce one unit of the finished product.
Hence, in an effective application of JIT, work
centers will be given just enough material from inventory and
downstream work-in-process to do a given job at the exact time
it is needed. A key component of this coordination is an
information system called a Kanban, the Japanese word for
card. The type and number of units required by the production
process are written on Kanbans, which are used to initiate the
withdrawal of inventory and the production of units through
the production process. By beginning at the final assembly,
the Kanban pulls parts and components from preceding work
stations. The entire manufacturing process is synchronized to
the final assembly stage. In this fashion, JIT prohibits
earlier sources of supply and production from pushing units
forward and building unnecessary and excessive inventories.
[Ref. 18:p. 473]
Inventory is considered undesirable by JIT
manufacturers for the following reasons: (1) it hides quality
problems, and (2) carrying costs of inventory unnecessarily
increase the costs of production. Quality problems tend to be
covered up more frequently in non-JIT material management
systems, because in non-JIT systems unacceptable items are
often just replaced with good items from inventory, without
any investigation concerning the cause of the original defect.
As a result, JIT proponents claim that there is a tendency
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among non-JIT companies to accept mediocre, second rate work
as the norm. Additionally, JIT proponents profess that
carrying costs associated with inventories drive down profit.
On the average, carrying costs increase the cost of material
25 to 35 percent. (Ref. 13:p. 433]
As can be seen, this inventory management and
distribution system does not permit the shipment of large lots
from suppliers. Consequently, suppliers must deliver materials
frequently and in small quantities. Again, as with MRP,
traditional purchasing methods frequently are not conducive to
meeting JIT's stringent requirements. The very nature of a
JIT operation requires closer, more cooperative relationships
between buyers and suppliers. Therefore, from a practical
point of view, a reduced supplier base is a necessity, and a
longer-term contract is the primary incentive that attracts a
supplier to consider this arrangement. [Ref. 13:p. 437]
3. Total Quality Management (TQM)
The final major influence on the adoption of long-term
contracting practices is TQM. Many public and private
organizations have officially adopted TQM as the philosophical
and practical guiding principles by which it will manage
resources in the 1990s and hence into the next century. (Ref.
19:p. 1]
This concept can be best summed up by the phrase, "Do
it right the first time." TQM is a total integrated
management approach directed at achieving customer
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satisfaction by continuous improvement of the quality of a
service or product. It attempts to address quality during all
phases of a service/product life-cycle by the application of
statistical process control methods. Although TQM has been
shaped by many individuals (e.g., Dr. W. Edwards Deming, Dr.
J.M. Juran, Mr. P.B. Crosby, etc.) over the past forty or so
years, this researcher believes that Dr. Deming's approach has
had the greatest impact on TQM's implementation throughout the
U.S.
According to Dr. Deming, many U.S. firms in the past
competed primarily on price differentiation (i.e., producing
an acceptable product for the lowest cost), with little
emphasis being placed on quality. These firms believed that
increasing quality only made their product more expensive and
therefore less competitive. Dr. Deming, however, believes
just the opposite. He says that increasing quality will
increase the cost of the product initially, but that in the
long run it will actually decrease the cost of producing the
product. This is because downstream mistakes and rework in
manufacturing are usually more expensive (e.g., extra material
costs, machine time, tools, and human effort) than improving
quality up-front in a product's life-cycle. Thus, he says,
firms which use TQM are better able to capture the market in
the long run; not only can they provide products at lower
prices, but they can provide higher quality products.
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Dr. Deming believes that variation is a major cause of
quality deficiencies. In particular, the more variation that
is introduced into a process, the less likely it is for an
organization, no matter how hard employees and management
work, to meet its expected quality parameters. According to
Dr. Deming, a major cause of inherent variation in a
production process comes from supplier material and
components. Firms normally buy material from many suppliers
and primarily on the basis of lowest price. Unfortunately, no
matter how good they are, no two suppliers can produce an item
meeting the same exact specifications. Buying strictly on
price alone, without considering quality, also indirectly
increases the variation of material. Therefore, Dr. Deming
advocates that organizations begin a practice of establishing
long-term contractual relationships with fewer, but higher
quality vendors. (Ref. 14:p. 64]
D. LONG-TERM CONTRACTING IN THE GOVERNMENT
Private industry is actively using long-term contracting
whenever feasible. However, many individuals believe that the
Government is not able to implement it on the same magnitude.
This is not due to less desire by the Government to use long-
term contracting, but rather they theorize it is due to
inherent differences between public and commercial contracting
practices. This final section of Chapter II will explore, from
a very general perspective, the use of long-term contracting
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in the Government. The researcher will highlight this topic
by focusing on three areas: (1) Government long-term contract
types, (2) Government contract options, and (3) general
barriers to using long-term contracting in the Government.
1. Government Long-Term Contract Types
Although to date there are no regulatory instructions
in the Government concerning the specific use and types of
long-term contracts, there are two contract types currently
available that are best suited for this procurement method.
[Ref. 20:p. 3] They are:
* Indefinite Delivery Contracts
* Multiyear Contracts
a. Indefinite Delivery Contracts
An indefinite delivery contract (IDC) is a type of
contract used for ordering supplies or services, during a
specified period of time, for which the requirements for
delivery and/or quantity are not firm, and which negotiation
or advertising of each requirement, as it becomes firm, is not
advantageous or feasible. The ordering period may vary
depending upon the procurement cycle of the items covered by
the contract, the normal industry practice, and the production
capacity of the contractor. Performance is obtained by
issuing orders under the contract, in accordance with the
price and delivery schedule agreed upon when the contract was
established. (Ref. 21:p. 27] One advantage of IDCs is that
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they permit the Government to maintain inventory stocks at
minimum levels. Another significant advantage of IDCs is that
they reduce transportation costs. Under IDCs, materia] is
normally shipped directly to users. (Ref. 22:p. 16.5]
To be considered for acquisition under an IDC, a
stable design must be present. The item, however, need not be
exclusively a commercial or modified commercial item. For
instance, items do not need to have a national stock number
assigned to be purchased. But they must, at a minimum, have
a designated manufacturer part number or have been made to a
set specification or drawing. Additionally, there must exist
recurring demand for the item and reasonable expectation that
future requirements will materialize. [Ref. 20:p. I-1]
Actually there are three specific types of IDCs:
(1) definite quantity contracts (DQCs), (2) requirements
contracts (RCs), and (3) indefinite-quantity contracts (IQCs).
A DQC provides for delivery of a definite quantity of specific
supplies or services for a fixed period, with deliveries to be
scheduled at designated locations upon order. DQCs are
appropriate for use when a definite quantity of supplies or
services will be required during the contract period and when
they will be regularly available or be available after a short
lead time. Although contract price tends to be cheaper with
DQCs, they are not as flexible as the other two methods.
Another disadvantage of DQCs is that funds must be obligated
up-front like conventional contract types. (Ref. 22:p. 16.5]
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An RC is an indefinite delivery contract
established for a specified period of time, under which the
Government must place all orders for RC covered items with the
designated vendor in the contract. RCs are used when the
Government anticipates recurring requirements but cannot
predetermine the precise quantities of supplies or services
that are needed during a specific contract period. Although
the Government is not required to identify the exact quantity,
the contracting officer is required to state a realistic
estimated total quantity in the solicitation and resulting
contract. The contract shall also state, if feasible, a
maximum and minimum order quantity. (Ref. 2 2:p. 16.5) The
primary advantages of this method is that it allows for a
great deal of ordering flexibility and funds are not obligated
until orders are actually placed. The major disadvantage of
this method is the potential for supply shortages should the
contractor fail to deliver or deliver non-issuable stock.
[Ref. 20:p. 1-2]
The final type of IDCs are indefinite-quantity
contracts. IQCs are very similar to RCs. As with RCs, IQCs
are used when the Government cannot predetermine specific
quantities of supplies or services for a certain time frame.
However, with IQCs the Government is required to order at
least a stated contractual minimum. Although the Government
may establish minimum quantities with RCs, it is not required
to do so. To ensure that the contract is binding, the minimum
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quantity must be more than a nominal quantity, but it should
not exceed the amount that the Government is fairly certain to
order. The contract may also specify maximum or minimum
quantities that the Government may order under each delivery
order and the maximum that it may order during a specific
period of time. [Ref. 22:p. 16.5] In addition to after-the-
fact obligation of funds, a primary advantage of IQCs is that
the Government is not contractually obligated to purchase all
requirements from one contractor, as is the case with RCs.
Two disadvantages of IQCs are the possibility that prices may
be slightly higher than under DQCs and the fact that ordering
flexibility is limited because the Government is obligated to
a minimum quantity. [Ref. 20:p. 1-3]
b. Nultiyear Contracts
Multiyear contracting is a special contracting
method, which may be used to competitively acquire a wide
range of services and supplies, both commercial and military
unique, needed during a period greater than one year but less
than five years. Until the past few years, multiyear
contracting was used very sparingly and primarily only with
the acquisition of major systems and services. Today,
although there are still many legislative impediments, it is
increasingly being used in the Government for the procurement
of a wide range of recurring demand items, with stable
specifications and requirements. The Defense Personnel
Support Center, for instance, is currently using multiyear
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contracts for shelf-life pharmaceutical items. Under this
program, the contractor stores the item for the Government and
rotates the dated stock with updated stock as the expiration
date approaches. [Ref. 20:p. I-3] Multiyear contracting may
be used when no-year or multiyear funds are available, or in
the case of one-year funds, when multiyear contracting is
specifically authorized by statute. 3 No matter what type of
fund is used though, typically money is appropriated annually
under multiyear contracts.
Unfortunately, multiyear contracts are often
subject to being cancelled or terminated by the Government.
Cancellation would occur if, at the completion of the fiscal
year, the Government did not continue the contract for
subsequent fiscal years due to lack of funding. The
contractor is protected from loss in this event by contractual
provisions allowing reimbursement for unrecovered,
nonrecurring cost included in prices for cancelled items
(e.g., capital investment and employee training), prorated
over the life of the contract. Although there is no limit on
this ceiling, in most cases the first year ceiling will not
exceed $100 million. Multiyear contracts which contain a
3DoD, however, may enter into multiyear acquisitions, with
one year funds, for the following services (and items of
supply relating to such services) without a specific statute:
(1) Operation, maintenance, and support of facilities; (2)
Maintenance or modification of aircraft, ships, vehicles, and
other highly complex military equipment; (3) Specialized
training requiring high quality instructor skills; (4) Base
services; and (5) Maintenance and operation of family housing.
[Ref. 23:p. 217.1]
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ceiling in excess of $100 million must first be approved by
the Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services of the
House of Representatives and the Senate.
Termination would occur if during the course of
the fiscal year the Government elected to terminate the
remaining portion of the contract. The termination liability
would include an amount for both current year termination
expenses and the out-year cancellation charges. [Ref. 24:p.
6-6]
In multiyear contracting, prices are solicited for
both the current single year requirements and for the total
multiyear requirements. When price factors are the basis for
the evaluation, award is based on the offer that produces the
lowest overall cost to the Government. A cost benefit/cost
avoidance technique is used to compare single year
procurements with the multiyear through discounted cash flow
and net present value techniques. Nevertheless, the use of a
solicitation requesting only multiyear prices may be used
when: "Competition in future acquisitions would be
impracticable after award of a contract covering the first
program year requirement and it is necessary to prevent a
first program year buy-in." [Ref. 20:p. 1-4]
Because of the long-term impact on prices of
multiyear contracts, two pricing techniques are often used:
(1) economic price adjustments, and (2) level unit pricing.
For example, Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) subpart 17.1
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encourages the contracting officer to use an economic price
adjustment clause when the labor and material costs are likely
to fluctuate during the period of performance. When economic
price adjustments are not used the contracting officer is
normally required to maintain the same unit price for each
line item or service for all years of the multiyear contract.
As can be seen, level unit pricing is accomplished by
amortizing certain costs over the entire contract quantity.
In addition, level unit pricing is generally used for the
evaluation of multiyear offers. However, the head of the
contracting activity or a designee, may approve the use of
variable unit pricing, provided there is a valid method for
evaluation of offers. [Ref. 22:p 17.1]
FAR subpart 17.103 identifies five general
criteria indicating when the use of multiyear contracting, in
the Government, may be appropriate. Specifically, multiyear
contracting may be used when:
1) The use of such a contract will result in reduced total
costs under the contract.
2) The minimum need for the item to be purchased is expected
to remain substantially unchanged during the contemplated
contract period in terms of production rate, acquisition
rate, and total quantities.
3) There is reasonable expectation that throughout the
contemplated contract period the department or agency will
request funding for the contract at the level required to
avoid contract cancellation.
4) There is a stable design for the item to be acquired and
the technical risks associated with such items are not
excessive.
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5) The estimates of both the cost of the contract and the
anticipated cost avoidance through the use of a multiyear
contract are realistic. 4
Multiyear contracting can result in significant
savings for the Government. A 1987 General Accounting Office
study, for example, found that the overall average unit price
of eleven multiyear contracts studied was reduced 7.8 percent
from the prior year annual contracts and 9.9 percent from the
average price for the two prior years. [Ref. 25:p. 6] The
most immediate savings came from reducing start-up and other
nonrecurring costs such as special tooling and special test
equipment, plant rearrangement costs, pre-production
engineering, specialized work force training, and so on.
Under multiyear contracting the contractor can spread or
amortize these costs over the full contract quantity rather
than only over a single year's quantity. Additionally,
multiyear contracts tend to result in increased
standardization, reduced administrative burden, continuing
production, and a stabilized work force. (Ref. 24:p. 6-6]
Not only is multiyear contracting advantageous to the
Government, but in many cases, contractors seem to prefer it.
4DoD activities must meet these five general criteria and
also three additional criteria. They are: (1) The use of such
a contract will promote the national security of the U.S.; (2)
The contract provides for a production rate at not less than
minimum economic production rates given the existing tooling
and facilities; and (3) The economic order quantity of the
advance acquisition which precedes the multiyear acquisition
is funded at least to the limits of the Government's
liability. [Ref. 23:p. 217.1]
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For instance, a 1983 survey, conducted by two students at the
Naval Postgraduate School, found that 73 percent of
Government-oriented businesses favor multiyear contracts over
single year contracts. [Ref. 26:p. 25]
The major disadvantage of multiyear contracting to
the Government is funding risk. If funds are not made
available for the full contract period or if the design
features of the item are changed, the Government may find
itself with useless parts and with an obligation to reimburse
the contractor for its unamortized costs. From a contractor's
point of view, the major potential drawback of multiyear
contracting is increased financial risk. As previously
discussed, the cancellation charge is based only on start-up
and other nonrecurring costs. Any costs incurred by the
contractor for the performance of future year requirements
(recurring costs) are not generally recoverable. Thus a
contractor, wanting to purchase material for the entire
multiyear requirement in advance, must normally assume the
risk that the contract will not be cancelled. [Ref. 24:p. 6-
6]
2. Government Contract Options
In addition to the above mentioned contract types, a
contract option can also be used by the contracting officer
when a longer contractual approach is preferred for a
particular procurement. A contract option is the unilateral
right of the Government to purchase additional supplies or
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services, or to extend the term of a contract, for a specified
period of time. For the inventory manager, this translates to
a flexible means to satisfy unplanned requirements, and to
significantly reduce administrative lead time. For the buyer,
the contract option represents an administrative time saver,
allowing an immediate award to be processed without the
requirement to re-synopsize and re-compete the option
quantity. When future funding is uncertain, the contract
option can also be used to obtain needed supplies and services
when additional funds actually become available. Normally,
the option is synopsized with the potential contract in the
Commerce Business Daily and is evaluated with the offer as
part of the overall evaluation process. If the option is not
evaluated at time of award, a justification for other than
full and open competition is required at the time the option
is exercised.
As can be seen, there are actually two distinct
options available to a contracting officer: (1) a quantity
option, and (2) a term option. Under the quantity option, the
Government has the unilateral right to purchase additional
supplies or services in the amount specified in the contract.
The second option allows the contracting officer to
unilaterally extend the term of the contract (usually five
years or less) and is generally used with IDCs or service
contracts. When used with an IDC, this option allows the
Government to enter into a contract covering more than the
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basic contract requirements (generally one year's
requirements), without the associated cancellation liability
of multiyear contracts. Therefore, a term option not only
allows the contracting officer to transform a traditional
(short-term) contractual relationship into a long-term
contractual relationship, but it allows him/her to do it, in
many cases, with increased flexibility. Term options may also
be used with multiyear contracts. As such, a five year
contract, in theory, can actually become a ten year contract.
Although often favorable to the Government, IDC/multiyear-
option contracts are not always viewed positively by
contractors. 3 Potential contract extensions make it much more
difficult for contractors to accurately project costs. (Ref.
22:p. 17.2]
3. Barriers to Long-Term contracting in the Government
Although the researcher has highlighted the long-term
contract types/techniques available to the Government, the
literature review indicates that current Government
procurement policies and regulations concerning competition
and budgeting often impede the Government's ability to use a
long-term approach for the procurement of goods and services.
The three major universally accepted general practices which
3A term option can protect the Government from loss of
coverage resulting from delays in placing subsequent
contracts, such as a lengthy pre-award survey, processing of
a certificate of competency, or evaluation of alternative
offers.
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the researcher found in the literature review to be inhibiting
Government's use of long-term contracts are:
* Competition Practices
* Awarding Contracts Primarily On Price
* Single Year Budgeting
a. Competition Practices
Both the Government and commercial firms use
competition, but their practices of it differ, especially
regarding mandatory competition. This is because of the
inherent difference between a public and a commercial activity
concerning competition. The later is primarily concerned
about the efficiency of an expenditure and therefore only uses
competition when it makes economic sense to do so. On the
other hand, since a Government activity deals with public
funds, there is a need for fairness or equity in its
expenditure, as well as some level of efficiency.
Unfortunately, these two concepts often conflict and the
overriding need for fairness often acts as an inhibitor to
adopting many sound commercial buying practices, such as
establishing and maintaining good, cooperative, and long-term
supplier relationships.
The requirement for competition is not new to the
Government. Almost since the founding of the nation,
competition has been the preferred method of obtaining goods
and services by the Government. This longstanding principle
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was reaffirmed by the Armed Services Procurement Act (ASPA) in
1947 and the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) in 1984.
ASPA required that contracts for goods and services be
formally advertised or competitively negotiated, whenever
practicable. CICA amended the ASPA to require the Government
to use full and open competition (with seven limited
exceptions) in all buys. This has resulted in a proliferation
of bids for Government contracts and a multitude of suppliers,
adding significant "non-value-added" costs. Additionally, a
1990 survey on TQM barriers in DoD, conducted by a student at
the Naval Postgraduate School, found that CICA was the number
two most significant barrier blocking implementation of TQM in
DoD. [Ref. 19:p. 57]
Not only can the requirement for full and open
competition be a problem at the prime contract level, but
many DoD contractors also stop short of establishing effective
partnerships with their suppliers. For example, a 1991
survey, conducted by a another student at the Naval
Postgraduate School, found that 39 percent of defense
contractors had difficulty in establishing long-term
relationships with their suppliers versus 0 percent for
companies that had recently won the Baldridge National Quality
Award. This survey also found that the primary cause of
defense contractors' difficulty in establishing long-term
relationships with suppliers was due to Government competition
requirements. [Ref. 27:p. 62]
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Again, although there are many times when
competition is effective and should be utilized, there are
other instances when it may not be the most efficient or even
the most prudent way of doing business.
b. Awarding Contracts Primarily on Price
Awarding contracts primarily on lowest price is
another practice which impedes the use of long-term
contracting in the Government. For instance, many commercial
buyers seek out suppliers of high-quality, reasonably priced
products and then stay with them as long as the relationship
remains mutually beneficial. This does not mean though that
new suppliers are never considered. If a new supplier can
show that it can provide an optimal balance between getting
maximum value at an affordable price, then they should and
often do get rewarded with a firm's business. However, this
practice of awarding on best value does significantly reduce
the chance of frequently changing suppliers. Unfortunately,
most Governmental contract awards continue to go to the lowest
priced, responsive, and responsible offerer. Although the
Government is not precluded from using the concept of best
value; no defined criteria exist for evaluating quality or
determining best value. (Ref. 28:p. 63] In addition, without
some sort of defined criteria, it is much easier for losing
offerors to successfully protest awards when factors other
than price are considered.
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Thus, the researcher recommends the Government
establish an objective quality and past performance system
that can be measured and which can withstand administrative
protests. Although it is much easier said than done,
organizations in DoD are attempting to do just this. For
example, The "Blue Ribbon Supplier" systems being established
in the Services and the Defense Logistics Agency recognize a
supplier's past performance and apply a percentage cost bonus
in subsequent source selections.
Additionally, the Report of the Defense Systems
Management College 1988-89 Military Research Fellows
recommends that DoD move away from minimum specifications that
allow selections to be made solely on price, to variable-
incentive performance specifications, based on acceptable
ratios between cost and performance (e.g., a 10 percent
improvement in mean time between failure would be valued at 5
percent of the acquisition price). Not only would use of
variable-incentive performance specifications reduce the
practice of awarding contracts on price alone, but they would
also encourage the Government to utilize a long-term
contracting approach. [Ref. 1:p. 55)
c. Single Year Budgeting
The third major universally accepted obstacle
which the Government faces when attempting to use long-term
contracting procedures is the practice of single year
budgeting. Defense procurement normally proceeds by a series
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of annual steps. The annual defense appropriation act
provides funding for the purchase of "requirements" as
programmed year by year for the Five-Year Defense Plan.
Specifically, there are three types of appropriated funds: (1)
annual funds, (2) multiyear funds, and (3) no year funds.
Although these time frames define the varying periods
available for obligation, the funds carried in the annual
appropriation act are one-year appropriations unless the act
specifically provides otherwise. This is provided by statute
(section 1501 of 31 USC) which reads:
Except as otherwise provided by law, all balances of
appropriations contained in the annual appropriation bills
and made specifically for the service of any fiscal year
shall only be applied to the payment of expenses properly
incurred during that year, or to the fulfillment of
contracts properly made within that year.
This statute, coupled with the fact that funds
must normally be available before creating an obligation,
limits the use of normal contracting types and methods to a
short-term procurement approach. Unfortunately, single year
budgeting also significantly reduces the effectiveness of
multiyear contracts and IDCs. As stated earlier, a
Governmental contracting office may not use multiyear
contracting for procurements financed with annual funds in the
absence of specific statute. Therefore, although in recent
years Congress has relaxed the usage requirements of multiyear
contracting, a contracting agency, because of single year
budgeting, must still either have no-year or multiyear funds
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specifically appropriated for the particular procurement or
must ensure that there is a specific statute authorizing the
use of annual funds. Many agencies are willing to go through
this highly bureaucratic process for "large ticket items," but
are normally unwilling to do it for smaller buys. And,
although IDC's ordering periods vary, they normally cannot
exceed one year due to the expiration associated with annual
appropriated funds.
Consequently, because of single year budgeting,
Government agencies are often encouraged to take a short-term
procurement approach, even when a long-term approach may make
better business sense.
E. SUMMARY
During approximately the past ten years there has been a
fundamental change taking place in the way purchasing is being
conducted. Recently, logistical concepts such as best value,
just-in-time, materials requirements planning, and total
quality management have caused organizations to move away from
short-term contracts to longer term contracts.
Unfortunately, an exact definition for long-term
contracting was not found during the literature review, but
the researcher did find four characteristics of long-term
contracting which appear universally accepted. These are:
long-term formal relationships designed to enhance
buyer/seller cooperation, partnerships, winner-take-all
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contract awards, and strategic source planning. The primary
purpose of these longer term contracts is to improve problem
solving, reduce costs, improve quality, improve resource
planning, and increase supplier investment.
Although there are many advantages, there are also
disadvantages with long-term contracts, such as loss of
competition and becoming dependent on the other party. The
type of relationship that is most desirable really depends on
the details of each specific procurement. In general,
however, the advantages of long-term contracting can often
outweigh its negatives.
In addition, although this concept has been proven to be
successful by private industry, the literature review
indicates that Government procurement practices and
regulations concerning competition and budgeting may impede
the Government's ability to use a long-term contracting
approach.
The next chapter highlights the results of a survey which
was conducted to determine to what extent Government
procurement practices and regulations concerning competition
and budgeting affect DoD's ability to utilize a long-term
contracting approach and to identify any successful long-term





Data for this part of the thesis were obtained primarily
from a questionnaire mailed to individuals from private
industry, as well as to individuals from DoD procurement
offices. Additionally, follow-up telephone interviews were
conducted with selected questionnaire respondents.
The objective of the questionnaire was to examine certain
specific issues surrounding the use of long-term contracting
by both private industry and DoD, in hopes that this
information can be applied in a way that will be beneficial to
DoD's current long-term contracting initiative.
Anonymity was afforded to all individuals who responded to
the questionnaire in case they did not wish to be identified
as sources of information for their respective organizations.
1. Questionnaire structure
The first part of the questionnaire was designed to
obtain demographic information concerning the respondents
(e.g., name, organization, position, and acquisition
experience).
Questions one and two allowed individuals to indicate
whether or not they wished their answers to remain
confidential and whether or not they were willing to discuss
their views with the researcher by telephone. Approximately
49
50 percent of respondents wanted their answers to remain
confidential and approximately 90 percent were willing to
further discuss their views with the researcher.
Question three asked for the organization's primary
business. (Appendix C lists the main products of companies
that participated in the survey.)
Question four asked whether their organization used
long-term contracts when purchasing goods and services.
The remainder of the questions were designed to elicit
specific information concerning the use of long-term contracts
by respondents who answered yes to question four. In
particular, these questions were designed to determine how
often respondents used long-term contracts; types of goods and
services being contracted for on a long-term basis; types of
contracts, pricing arrangements, incentives, and special
contracting methods used with long-term contracts; barriers
faced when using long-term contracts; and characteristics of
successful long-term contracts.
2. Demographics, Soliaitations, and Responses
Approximately 250 questionnaires were mailed in the
course of this research and 163 were returned. One hundred
and thirty questionnaires were sent to the senior procurement
officials employed by companies (both large and small) that
specialize in both commercial and defense related work. Of
the 130 questionnaires sent to private industry, 86 went to
suppliers of DoD that were selected at random and the
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remaining 45 were mailed to firms selected at random that are
members of the Aerospace industries Association. There were
83 individuals from private industry who responded. Seven of
which were further interviewed by the researcher via
telephone.
One hundred and nineteen questionnaires were sent to
the senior procurement officials of DoD organizations involved
in the procurement of goods and services. Specifically, 32
were sent to Army activities; 27 to Air Force activities; 42
to Navy activities; 10 to Marine activities; and 8 to Defense
Logistics Agency activities. These organizations consisted of
the major military purchasing offices listed in DoD Manual
4205.1-M, entitled, "Selling to the Military." There were 80
individuals from DoD who responded. Twelve of which were
further interviewed by the researcher via telephone.
Table 3.1 is a summary of the number of questionnaires
mailed and returned and Table 3.2 provides a summary of the
average number of years of acquisition experience by
respondents. Although in many cases the actual director of
purchasing/contracting did not respond personally, Table 3.2
shows that they usually instructed someone else, with quite a
bit of acquisition experience, to reply.
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TABLE 3.1; QUESTIONNAIRES MAILED/RETURNED
NUMBER OF QUESTIONNAIRES MAILED AND RETURNED.




TABLE 3.2; AVERAGE ACQUISITION EXPERIENCE OF RESPONDENTS
HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU WORKED IN THE ACQUISITIONFIELD?________________FIELD? 
Private Ind.
Years 17 21
B. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
In this section the researcher will present and analyze
the results of questions four through sixteen of the survey.
These questions were divided into two groups. One group
includes data submitted by DoD procurement offices and the
other group includes data submitted by private industry. In
turn, the responses to the questionnaire for both groups were
broken down into the following categories: (1) use of long-
term contracts (questions four through seven), (2) goods and
services contracted (questions eight and nine), (3) types of
contracts and pricing arrangements (question ten), (4)
incentives (questions eleven and twelve), (5) unique
contracting arrangements (question thirteen), (6) barriers
(question fourteen), and (7) general (questions fifteen and
sixteen).
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1. Use of Long-Term Contracts
Question four sought to determine if the organizations
surveyed were using long-term contracts when purchasing goods
and services. In addition, for those who answered no,
question four asked respondents to briefly describe why not.
As shown in Table 3.3, 89 percent of respondents from DoD and
84 percent of respondents from private industry indicated that
they utilize long-term contracts. These results are exactly
opposite to what the researcher expected. Based on the
literature review, the researcher assumed that the survey
would reveal that private industry used long-term contracts
more often than DoD.
TABLE 3.3; USE OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
DOES YOUR ORGANIZATION USE LONG-TERM CONTRACTS WHEN
PURCHASING GOODS AND SERVICES?




There were only a few reasons why those who responded
no, did not use long-term contracts. The reason most cited by
DoD procurement offices was the practice of single year
budgeting in DoD. Other reasons given by DoD activities
included CICA, and the fact that the types of items they
procured did not lend themselves to long-term contracting.
Company policies of not committing for more than one year's
requirements were the primary reason for not using long-term
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contracts by private industry. However, a majority of these
commercial organizations which gave this reason also stated
that the company was currently considering using long-term
contracting when it made good business sense to do so. For
instance, one purchasing supervisor said, "Until recently, our
company has had a policy of not committing for more than one
year's requirements, but the company is currently in the
process of implementing a few select long-term agreements."
Other reasons mentioned by private industry were low rate
production, and the fact that the types of items they procured
did not lend themselves to long-term contracting.
Questions five and six were designed to determine
exactly how often organizations (which say they use long-term
contracts) actually use long-term contracts. In particular,
question five asked for the dollar value percentage of an
organization's contracts that are of a long-term nature. And
question six asked what percent of the number of an
organization's contracts are of a long-term nature. The
results of questions five and six are listed in Tables 3.4 and
3.5 respectively.
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TABLE 3.4; PERCENTAGE OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS BY DOLLAR
WHAT PERCENT OF THE DOLLAR VALUE OF YOUR CONTRACTS FOR
THE PROCUREMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES ARE OF A LONG-
TERM NATURE?
DoD _ Private Ind.,
O to 20% 7% 33%
21 to 40% 24% 38%
41 to 60% 15% 19%
61 to 80% 27% 5%
81 to 100% 27% 5%
TABLE 3.5; PERCENTAGE OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS BY NUMBER
WHAT PERCENT OF THE NUMBER OF YOUR CONTRACTS FOR THE
PROCUREMENT OF GOODS AND SERVICES ARE OF A LONG-TERM
NATURE?
Private Ind.
0 to 20% 26% 59%
21 to 40% 17% 24%
41 to 60% 22% 13%
61 to 80% 13% 2%
81 to 100% 22% 2%
As shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, the statistical
results of these questions indicate that DoD uses long-term
contracts on a larger percentage by both dollar value and
frequency than do the companies surveyed. Specifically, on
the average, approximately 58 percent of the dollar value of
DoD contracts versus approximately 32 percent of private
industry contracts for the procurement of goods and services
are of a long term nature. And, on the average, approximately
47 percent of the number of DoD contracts versus approximately
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23 percent of private industry contracts are of a long-term
nature.
Question seven sought to determine the average lengths
of long-term contracts in DoD and private organizations. The
results of this question (Table 3.6) indicate that the average
length of a long-term contract is approximately 4 years in DoD
and approximately 3 years by the companies surveyed.
TABLE 3.6; AVERAGE LENGTH OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS
WHAT IS THE AVERAGE LENGTH OF YOUR LONG-TERM
CONTRACTS?
DoD Private Ind.
> 1 but < 2 years 0% 26%
> 2 but < 3 years 23% 34%
> 3 but < 4 years 32% 18%
> 4 but < 5 years 27% 10%
5 years or more 18% 12%
In summary, the results of section one of the
questionnaire were quite surprising. Not only did they
indicate that DoD is more likely to utilize long-term
contracts and to a greater degree than the companies surveyed,
but that on the average, DoD long-term contracts are of
greater lengths. Based on these results, it appears that
Government contracting policies and procedures concerning
competition and budgeting do not, in the final analysis,
prevent DoD from using long-term contracts.
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2. Goods and Services Contracted
The intention of this section of the questionnaire was
to determine what types of goods and services are most
conducive to being procured on a long-term basis. In order to
accomplish this objective, this section was comprised of two
questions. Question eight asked what types of goods and
services are procured on a long-term basis and why. And
question nine asked respondents what types of goods and
services they would like to contract for on a long-term basis
and why. The results of the first part of these questions
indicated that most recurring services and items (normally
common and/or of a stable design) purchased on a repetitive
basis, with firm requirements, were conducive to this type of
procurement approach.
The specific results of the first part of question
eight are presented in Table 3.7.
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TABLE 3.7; GOODS AND SERVICES CONTRACTED FOR LONG-TERM
WHAT TYPES OF GOODS AND SERVICES ARE YOU CURRENTLY
CONTRACTING FOR ON A LONG-TERM BASIS?
DoD Private Ind.
ADPE 4% 4%
Common Supplies 15% 21%
Construction Contracts 3% 0%
Eng./Tech. Services 13% 3%
Facility Services 22% 6%
Large & Complex Items 6% 2%
Logistic Support 3% 2%
Manufacturing Services 0% 4%
MRO Goods 8% 13%
Overhaul & Maintenance 14% 9%
Production Materials 0% 23%
Raw Materials 1% 9%
Research & Development 7% 2%
Transportation 4% 2%
Services
The results of the first part of question nine,
however, were not as easy to quantify. In many cases
respondents did not answer question nine or normally answered
it in the following general ways: (1) gave same response as
question eight, (2) said they would like to see any item or
service of a recurring nature with stable requirements
contracted for on a long-term basis, or (3) said there are no
additional items they would like to see contracted for on a
long-term basis.
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The reasons for using long-term contracts, provided by
both DoD and private industry respondents, were very similar
to the advantages of long-term contracts found in the
literature review portion of this thesis. For example, the
majority of respondents stated in questions eight and nine
that they had found through experience that long-term
contracting of materials and services of a stable and
recurring nature can save an organization money in two ways.
First, by purchasing larger quantities and providing suppliers
with assurances of future purchases, suppliers are able to
offer lower unit prices. Second, long-term contracting can
also significantly reduce ordering costs for the buyer. Other
reasons frequently given for why they used long-term contracts
included (1) enhances quality, (2) improves relationship with
suppliers, and (3) improves contracting efficiency (e.g.,
reduces contracting personnel workload and administrative lead
time). One DoD contracting supervisor, for instance, said:
"Long-term contracts save the Government time and money; with
limited resources you need ways of not having to go through
the procurement process as often."
3. Types of Contracts and Pricing Arrangements
Question ten solicited information concerning the type
of contracts and pricing arrangements used with long-term
contracts. Responses to this question (Table 3.8) indicate
that firm-fixed-price contracts are the most common type of
contract and pricing arrangement used by both DoD and private
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industry. Although there appears to be commonality concerning
the use of firm-fixed-price contracts, there are many
differences in the way other contract types and pricing
arrangements are employed by the respondents.
The first major difference is that DoD is more apt to
use cost type contracts. This is probably due to the fact
that DoD purchases a larger number of items and services
(e.g., research & development, facility services, and
engineering & technical services) that involve a greater
degree of risk to suppliers than does private industry.
A second major difference, revealed by Table 3.8, is
the use of economic price adjustments (EPAs) or other EPA type
arrangements. The primary reason why DoD does not use EPAs as
often as private industry is not because they do not want to,
but because EPAs require independent indices to be operative.
Unfortunately, for many DoD procured items and services,
indices have not been established or DoD and industry are not
able to agree on an equitable arrangement that can meet
regulatory requirements. On the other hand, commercial buying
organizations are more apt to buy items and services for which
indices can be established. And even when they cannot, they
are often able to renegotiate prices during the term and at
time of contract extension without reliance on a specific EPA
clause or other regulatory restrictions.
The final difference between the two survey
populations involves the use of indefinite delivery type
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contracts (IDCs) and options. Although both DoD and private
industry use IDCs and options; the DoD organizations surveyed
use them on a much larger scale. This is primarily due to the
fact that very few DoD organizations are able to use multiyear
contracts. Therefore, in order to establish long-term
contracts, without violating the Government's regulations
concerning single year budgeting, most DoD procurement offices
must use IDCs with option years or traditional one year base
contracts with additional option years.
TABLE 3.8; LONG-TERM CONTRACT TYPES AND PRICING ARRANGEMENTS
WHAT TYPES OF CONTRACTS AND PRICING ARRANGEMENTS ARE
YOU CURRENTLY USING ON YOUR LONG-TERM CONTRACTS?
Private Ind.
FFP 39% 63%






CR (no fee) 2% 0%
(T&M)/(LH) 9% 5%
Part two of question ten was designed to ascertain why
the organizations surveyed used the type of contracts and
pricing arrangements they did with long-term contracts. Both
DoD and private industry stated overwhelmingly that it is not
the nature or length of the contract which "drives" the
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contract type and pricing arrangement, but rather it is the
type of material or service being procured and the associated
uisk that compels this decision.
4. Incentives
Questions eleven and twelve were designed to determine
what types of incentives are used with long-term contracts.
For example, question eleven asked respondents what types of
incentives they offer their suppliers to accept long-term
contracts and why. And question twelve asked respondents what
types of incentives do suppliers ask for with long-term
contracts and why. Specifically, these questions sought to
determine if suppliers require incentives to accept long-term
contracts, and if so what are the incentives used.
As shown by Tables 3.9 and 3.10, a significant
percentage of buyers do not offer incentives and a significant
percentage of sellers do not ask for them with long-term
contracts. Many respondents, from both DoD and private
industry, stated that in most cases incentives were not
necessary with long-term contracts. They generally believed
that the long-term agreement itself was the only incentive
needed for a supplier to accept a long-term contract.
Another similarity, although intuitively obvious, is
also highlighted by Tables 3.9 and 3.10. In particular,
sc;llers generally ask for more incentives than offered by
buyers.
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TiLE 3.9; TYPES OF INCENTIVES OFFERED !,SUPLIEP{;
WHAT TYPES 0 INCENTIVES DO YOU OFFER YOUR o1PLIKTIR. S







TABLE 3.10; TYPES OF INCENTIVES SUPPLIERS ASK FORSWHAT TYPES OF INCENTIVES DO YOUR SUPPLIERS ASK FOR








Although there were two similarities, there were also
three major differences that surfaced in this section of the
survey. First, the results of question eleven indicated that
buyers from private industry were more likely to offer
incentives than their counterparts in DoD. For instance, and
as previously presented in Table 3.7, buyers from private
industry are more likely to offer EPAs. Second, buyers from
private industry were also much more willing to provide their
suppliers with technical and engineering assictance. And
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lastly, buyers from private industry were much more willing to
offer their suppliers "other" incentives. In particular, many
buyers from private industry said that they would guarantee
suppliers future contracts (often without competition) for
outstanding supplier performance. Some of the "other"
incentives offered by private industry included provisions for
prompt pay, and flexible pricing.
S. Unique Contracting Arrangements
Question thirteen asked respondents if they use any
unique contracting arrangements, special contracting methods,
or special contract clauses with long-term contracts. Results
are shown in Table 3.11. Thirty percent of DoD organizations
and 58 percent of companies from private industry responded
affirmatively.
TABLE 3.11; USE OF UNIQUE CONTRACTING ARRANGEMENTS
DO YOU USE ANY UNIQUE CONTRACTING ARRANGEMENTS,
SPECIAL CONTRACTING METHODS, OR SPECIAL CLAUSES TO
REDUCE RISK WITH LONG-TERM CONTRACTS?
__ _ EPrivatS InLd
Yes 30% 58%
No 70% 42%
This difference between DoD and private industry in
the area of unique contracting arrangements is fairly
significant. Some of the special contracting arrangements
used by private industry respondents included renegotiation
clauses to address over or under forecasted demands, special
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payment terms, non-committal letters of intent f or buying
future supplies and services, guaranteed lowest price clauses,
thirty day termination clauses, automatic extension clauses,
formula pricing, liquidated damages clauses for late delivery,
and guaranteed minimum and or not to exceed quantities.
Although the questionnaire found that DoD does not use
unique contracting arrangements as often, in many cases
however, DoD's special contracting arrangements are often more
innovative than the ones used by the companies surveyed. For
example, not only are DoD organizations using some of the
above arrangements and clauses when allowed by Government
regulations, and occasionally multiyear contracting, but a few
DoD activities (primarily the Defense Logistics Agency, Navy
Aviation Supply Office, and Navy Ships Parts Control Center)
are also using the following logistical concepts in
conjunction with their long-term contracting efforts:
* Economic Order Quantities
* Incremental Bidding
* Procurement Group Coding
* Multisource Contracting
a. Economic Order Quantitlei
10 U.S.C. 2384(a)(1) requires Government agencies
to procure supplies in such quantities that will result in the
total cost and unit cost most advantageous to the Government,
when practicable, and that does not exceed the quantity
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reasonably expected to be required by the agency. Although
the current DoD economic order quantity (that quantity which
minimizes total annual ordering costs and holding costs) does
not necessarily represent the actual manufacturer's economic
purchase quantity; this information can be solicited by the
contracting officer via inclusion of FAR provision 52.207-4,
Economic Purchase Quantity-Supplies, in solicitations for
supplies. The provision requests the offeror to identify
economic order quantities and quantity price information. In
turn, this information coupled with the DoD EOQ model may
alert procurement offices to the potential of a long-term
contracting approach. (Ref. 20:p. 11-4]
b. Zncremental Bidding
Incremental bidding is a method that some DoD
activities are currently using in order to acquire more than
one year's requirements through the use of one solicitation
and contract. Specifically, it provides a medium for offerors
to quote a range of prices for different fixed quantities. As
with economic order quantities, incremental bidding provides
the contracting officer with valuable information concerning
price and quantity combinations, and which in turn may result
in the selection of a long-term, rather than a short-term
procurement approach. [Ref. 20:p. 11-6]
c. Procurement Group Coding
Procurement group coding or "family buying," is
the concept of grouping together like items with similar
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characteristics to achieve contracting efficiency and to
reduce cost. It works like this: Requirements for materials
having similar technical and manufacturing characteristics
(which might be purchased from several vendors) are grouped
together under one requirement. Grouping of similar items
increases the dollar value of the solicitation, thereby
increasing industry interest in the acquisition. And, because
of the increase in requirements from grouping, a longer term
contract is often better suited for this type of special
contracting method than a single year contract.
d. Nultisource Contracting
Under this approach, some DoD activities are using
long-term contract types (e.g., IDCs and multiyear contracts),
but with more than one vendor for the same item. Under IDC
multisource contracting, placement of delivery orders may be
based on performance as well as price. For example, once the
guaranteed minimum quantities under an indefinite quantity
contract have been ordered, an evaluation matrix may be used
to determine which contractor will receive subsequent orders.
Factors of the evaluation may include price, delivery
performance, quality, management, etc. Another approach
involves the combination of multisource/multiyear contracting
for industrial mobilization. This approach combines multiyear
contracting with the exception to full and open competition,
in order to achieve adequate supplier availability in case of
national emergency, as provided by 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(3). This
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authority allows the Government to divide current production
requirements among two or more contractors, without
competition, in order to provide for an adequate industrial
base. [Ref. 20:p. 11-13]
6. Barriers
The purpose of question fourteen was to determine if
organizations face barriers in using a long-term contractual
approach with suppliers, and if so what are the barriers, and
what actions are being taken to reduce these barriers. As
reported by Table 3.12, 69 percent of individuals from DoD and
58 percent of individuals from private industry said they
faced barriers in using long-term contracts. The primary
barriers cited (Table 3.13) by DoD respondents were changing
requirements, CICA, "other," and single year budgeting. And,
the primary barriers cited (also Table 3.13) by private
industry respondents were changing requirements and "other."
Frequently, the private industry respondents stated
that the "other" factors which impeded their use of long-term
contracts were (1) often they are difficult to administer, (2)
losers can be alienated, (3) frequent price changes, and (4)
customer resistance. DoD "other" factors included the above,
as well as (1) frequent changes in state of technology, (2)
lack of authority to use multiyear contracting, (3) dollar
authority thresholds, (4) cost and pricing requirements, and
(5) resistance by the small business community.
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Based on the literature review the researcher was not
surprised that CICA and single year budgeting were mentioned
as barriers to DoD long-term contracting efforts. However,
the researcher was initially surprised by the number of DoD
respondents which said that changing requirements and "other"
factors impeded their use of long-term contracts, since these
impediments were not discovered during the literature review.
TABLE 3.12; PERCENTAGE OF ORGANIZATIONS FACING BARRIERS
DO YOU FACE ANY BARRIERS WHEN USING LONG-TERM




TABLE 3.13; TYPES OF BARRIERS FACED
IF YES, BRIEFLY DESCRIBE WHAT THEY ARE AND WHAT
ACTIONS YOU ARE TAKING TO REDUCE THESE BARRIERS?
Private Ind.
Changing Requirements 24% 41%
CICA 21% 9%
Not Using Best Value 9% 0%
Other 23% 50%
Single Year Budgeting7 23% 0%
Although both DoD and the companies surveyed from
private industry face significant barriers, the research
indicated that there are enough alternative contract types and
methods available to get around most long-term contract
impediments. For instance, although many DoD organizations
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are not able to use multiyear contracting, they are still
usually able to circumvent single year budgeting requirements
via the use of options. In addition, IDCs are used quite
frequently in conjunction with options when a long-term
contracting approach is desired, but exact quantities are not
firm. During follow-up telephone interviews, many DoD
respondents said they like the flexibility that IDCs/options
provided so much that they would probably not use multiyear
contracting even if no-year or multiyear funds were available.
Although most of the respondents from private industry
did not face regulatory or statutory barriers, they also
frequently used options and indefinite delivery types of
contracts.' Another method used by private industry
frequently to reduce long-term contracting barriers was to
offer suppliers some type of single source guarantee for good
performance. Additionally, commercial buying activities will
often use flexible pricing arrangements, such as adjusting the
contract price at time of contract extensions, in order to
reduce the risk of price fluctuations.
7. General
Question fifteen asked the organizations whether they
would like to see long-term contracts used more often and if
so why? Results are shown in Table 3.14. Seventy-seven
'Some of the respondents from private industry said that
CICA prevents them from establishing long-term contracts with
subcontractors on DoD related work.
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percent of DoD procurement offices and 92 percent of private
industry procurement officials responded affirmatively.
TABLE 3.14; ADDITIONAL USE OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS






As can be seen from Table 3.14, the majority of
respondents from both private industry and DoD say they would
like to see long-term contracts used more often. Although
there is a slight difference in percentages, it is probably
not significant. A large portion of the DoD respondents which
answered no said that they answered this way not because they
were against using long-term contracts, but because they felt
that their organizations were already using them to the full
extent possible.
Additionally, there was very strong agreement by both
populations on why they would like to see long-term contracts
used more often. The most commonly cited reasons included (1)
reduces product cost because of economies of scale, (2)
reduces procurement and administrative lead time, (3) improves
procurement buying efficiency, (4) establishes solid working
relationships with suppliers, (5) assists just-in-time
procurement efforts, and (6) often increases up-front
competition.
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The last question, question sixteen, was designed to
determine characteristics of successful long-term contracts.
The most frequently cited characteristic was the establishment
of a cooperative relationship with suppliers that involved
frequent and frank communication. For instance, one DoD
organization conducts quarterly "working group" meetings
involving key personnel from both the Government and private
industry in order to identify and resolve potential problems.
Other characteristics cited by both DoD and commercial buying
activities were (1) early supplier involvement, (2) adequate
requirement forecasts, (3) well thought out Statement of Works
and clear requirements, (4) strong and active contract
administration, (5) the selection of the right supplier, (6)
the use of best value criteria in source selection, (7)
options: because they provide buyers with a great deal of
flexibility, and (8) the use of electronic data interchange in
placing orders against long-term contracts.
C. SUiMMAY
This chapter presented the results of the survey and
follow-up interviews conducted for this study. The findings
showed that from a conceptual standpoint, DoD's long-term
contracting strategy is very similar to those of commercial
buying organizations. However, when actually put into action,
DoD does not always implement this strategy in the exact same
manner.
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For instance, both DoD and commercial buying organizations
use long-term contracting regularly for recurring services and
items (normally common and/or of a stable design), purchased
on a repetitive basis, for the same primary reasons. In
actual practice, however, the results indicated that not only
is DoD more likely to utilize long-term contracts and to a
greater degree than the companies surveyed, but that on the
average, DoD contracts are of greater length.
Another example revolves around the use cf contract types
and pricing arrangements. Although both DoD and commercial
buying organizations would prefer to use fixed-price type
contracts with long-term agreements, in many cases DoD is
unable to because the type of supplies and services they
procure are either not suited to fixed-price contracts or
indices are not available to adjust for fluctuations in costs.
On the other hand, commercial buying organizations are able to
enter into more flexible pricing arrangements. For example,
they are often able to renegotiate prices during the term and
at time of contract extensions without reliance on EPAs or
other regulatory restrictions. Additionally, because of
single year budgeting restrictions, DoD buying offices are
much more likely to use IDCs and options.
Lastly, the study revealed that the respondents from
private industry were more likely to offer their suppliers
incentives and were also more apt to use unique contracting
arrangements, special contracting methods, and special
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contract clauses with long-term contracts. Again, this is not
due to less desire or willingness by DoD, but rather is
because commercial buying practices permit more flexibility
than do Government procurement practices.
The next chapter will present the conclusions and
recommendations on the findings that the researcher has
developed.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. BACKGROUND
Although there were no major revelations in the private
and public long-term contracting practices identified during
this study, some significant conclusions and recommendations
can still be obtained. They have implications for DoD and
oth2r Government agencies which may want to improve their
ability to utilize a long-term contracting approach.
B. CONCLUSIONS
In this section the researcher will answer the primary and
subsidiary research questions originally posed for this study
in Chapter I.
Primary Question:
To what extent is long-term contracting by DoD feasible
(considering current Government procurement practices and
regulations concerning competition and budgeting)?
The research indicated that DoD does in fact face more
barriers than commercial buying organizations when using long-
term contracts; however, there are enough contracting types
and arrangements, contracting methods, and special clauses
available to allow those DoD activities, which so desire, to
establish long-term relationships with suppliers.
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Although feasible, this does not mean it is easy to do so.
In order to use a long-term contracting approach, a great deal
of acquisition research and planning is required up-front, as
well as spending additional time definitizing the terms,
conditions, and price of the actual contract. This is
especially true for Government agencies, which do not have the
same degree of procurement flexibility as private buying
organizations. However, in many cases, the additional time
spent up-front for one long-term contract, will save countless
hours of valuable procurement man-hours that would be needed
to place multiple short-term contracts.
Subsidiary Questions:
1) What is long-term contracting?
2) What are the advantages and disadvantages of long-term
contracts?
3) What are the major influences on long-term contracting?
4) In the Government, what are the long-term contract types
available, long-term contract techniques available, and
general impediments to long-term contracting?
5) What types of goods and services, contract types and
pricing arrangements, incentives, and unique contracting
arrangements lend themselves to long-term contracting?
6) What are the most common characteristics of successful
long-term contracts?
Subsidiary Ouestion J 1 - This question kept reappearing
throughout thecourse of the study. Primarily this happened
because there is no exact definition of a long-term contract,
and therefore almost every procurement organization,
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especially in DoD, has a different idea of exactly what it is.
For example, some individuals normally do not include options
as part of their definition for long-term contracts; while
others do. Thus, for the purpose of the thesis, the
researcher defined long-term contracts to be those contracts
(including options) which are written to establish a
buyer/seller relationship longer than traditionally expected
(usually longer than one year) in a normal competitive
environment. The aim of which is to cultivate a buyer/seller
relationship which enhances the level of product or service
quality expected by the buyer and delivered by the seller.
In addition, although an exact definition of long-term
contracting does not exist, the researcher did find four
characteristics of long-term contracting which appear
universally accepted. The are: (1) long-term formal
relationships, (2) partnerships, (3) winner-take-all contract
awards, and (4) strategic source planning. Specifically, this
means that most long-term type contracts are designed to
establish cooperative formal relationships, characterized by
mutual dependence and open communication, with a small number
of high-quality suppliers, over a period of time longer than
normally expected in traditional, competitive ways of doing
business.
Subsidiary Ouestion 1 2 - Like almost every decision in
life, there are pros and cons of that decision, and long-term
contracting is no exception. For example, some of the
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advantages of long-term contracting include improved problem
solving, reduction of costs, improved quality, improved
resource planning, increased supplier investment, and improved
procurement efficiency. The primary potential disadvantages
include loss of competition, becoming overly dependant on the
other party, and alienation of losing suppliers.
The type of relationship that is most desirable really
depends on the details of each specific procurement. However,
when purchasing recurring services and supplies, with firn
requirements, from a quality manufacturer, the advantages of
a long-term contract can often outweigh its negatives.
Subsidiary Question 1 3 - The research indicated that
there have been many different factors which have encouraged
the use of long-term contracting over the past ten or so
years. Four major influences were identified in the
literature review portion of the study (Chapter II). They
are: (1) the concept of best value, (2) just-in-time
production planning, (3) material requirements planning, and
(4) total quality management. In each one of these concepts,
long-term contracting plays a vital role in their success.
In addition, a fifths major factor was identified by the
questionnaire responses. This factor is business downsizing.
Both public and private organizations are facing labor force
reductions and therefore are looking for ways to "accomplish
more with less." And, in many cases, long-term contracts can
do just this.
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Stibsidiary Question A - The research indicated that
there is one primary long-term contract technique available to
DoD and other Government procurement activities. This
technique involves the use of contract options. Again, a
contract option allows the Government to order additional
supplies or services under an existing contract and/or extend
the term of an existing contract. And although not actually
contract techniques, some DoD activities are using the
following concepts which can alert users to the potential
application of a long-term contracting approach: (1) use of
economic order quantities, (2) incremental bidding, (3)
procurement group coding, and (4) multisource contracting.
Additionally, the research showed that there are two
primary long-term contracts available to Government
procurement activities: (1) multiyear contracts and (2)
indefinite delivery contracts. Unfortunately, multiyear
contracts are used infrequently because of difficulty by some
DoD offices to get no-year or multiyear funds and the fact
that there is normally a high cancellation ceiling associated
with multiyear contracts. IDCs, however, are used often by
DoD and when coupled with a contract option allow Government
activities to enter into a contract covering more than the
basic requirements, without the cancellation liability of a
multiyear contract.
The general impediments to long-term contracting in
Government/DoD are (1) changing requirements, (2) CICA, (3)
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single year budgeting, and (4) "other factors." The "other
factors" cited, include difficulty to administer long-term
contracts, frequent price and technology changes, alienation
of losers, lack of authority to use multiyear contracts,
dollar authority thresholds, cost and pricing requirements,
and resistance by the small business community.
Subaidiary Ouestion 0 5 - The findings of the research
showed that most recurring services and items (normally common
and/or of a stable design) purchased on a repetitive basis,
with firm requirements, were conducive to being procured on a
long-term contract. Additionally, the questionnaire revealed
that firm-fixed-price and fixed-price with economic price
adjustment type clauses, in conjunction with IDCs and contract
options, are the moot comeon types of contracts and pricing
arrangements used with long-term contracts. However,
respondents from both DoO and commercial buying organizations
asserted overwhelmingly that it is not the nature or length of
the contract which "drives" the contract type and pricing
arrrngement, but rather it is the type of material or service
beinq procured and the asseciated risk that compels this
deci o n.
rho results of the questionnaire also indicated that
althouqh private industry was more likely to offer their
suppliers incentives then DoD, neither popuaietion ussO them
very often Many respondents stated that in moot cases
inc•entives were not neesosary with long-term contracts
s0
Zowcver, the types of incentives which were used occasionally
are cost (e.g., EPA type clauses or cost related pricing
inceIntives) and "other." The "oother" incentives are used
proe&ominately by commercial buying organizations and include
providing suppliers with technical and engineering assistance,
guarantees for future work, provisions for prompt pay, and
flexible pricing provisions.
lot only does private industry place greater emphasis on
long-term contracting incentives, but they tend to use special
contracting arrangements more often than DoD. Some of the
special contracting arrangements, used by the private industry
respondents, include renegotiation clauses to address over or
under forecasted demands, special payment terms, non-committal
letters of intent for buying future supplies and services,
guaranteed lowest price clauses, thirty day termination
clauses, automatic extension clauses, formula pricing,
liquidated damages clauses for late delivery, and guaranteed
minimum and or not to exceed quantities. DoD also uses some
of the above special arrangements and clauses when allowed by
Government regulations, as well as occasionally multiyear
contracting, hybrid contracts, incremental bidding,
procurement group coding, and multisource contracting.
Subsidiary Question # 6 - The most frequently cited
characteristic of successful long-term contacts by respondents
to the questionnaire was the establishment of a cooperative
relationship with suppliers that involved frequent and frank
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communication. Other characteristics mentioned by both DoD
and commercial buying activities were early supplier
involvement, adequate requirement forecasts, well thought out
Statement of Works and clear requirements, strong and active
contract administration, selection of the right supplier, the
use of best value criteria in source selection, the use of
options, and the use of electronic data interchange in placing
orders against long-term contracts.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the results of the survey indicated that
Government contracting policies and procedures concerning
competition do not, from a bottom-line perspective, prevent
DoD from using long-term contracts, this does not mean
however, that DoD is not often impeded in its efforts to do
so. As such, the researcher has developed five general
recommendatiorn : .1' • ilemented would assist DoD's and
other Governmen - 'et •ffices' long-term contracting
efforts.
Recommendation # 1 - Senior procurement officials must
make their employees aware of the various long-term contract
types, techniques, and methods available in the Government, as
well as their advantages and suitability for certain types of
materials and services. In addition, they must encourage
their employees to take the extra time needed up-front to
properly definitize long-term contracts.
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Recommendation # 2 - Government contracting practices
should be modified in order to be in consonance with good
commercial practices. For instance, some commercial buying
groups combine a company's complete product line on a single
award to maximize efficiency and minimize cost, regardless of
whether the items are competitive or single source. Statutory
and regulatory requirements for competition prohibit DoD
activities from taking this approach. The researcher does not
advocate that CICA should be eliminated, however. Competition
should be pursued when it makes good business sense, but it
should not be used just for the sake of competition.
Additionally and as discussed earlier, private industry
often renegotiates prices during the term and at time of
contract extensions without reliance on EPA* or other
regulatory restrictions. Giving DoD this same degree of
pricing flexibility would improve its ability to use long-term
contracts significantly.
1ac1" ation j 3 - The practice of single year budgeting
should be eliminated or at a minimum DoD should be given more
leeway in using out-year fui Um. For example, private industry
would prefer that DoD use true multiyear or multiple-year type
contracts, rather than usinq contract options. Unfortunately,
although IDCs and options give DoD a great deal of
flexibility, suppliers are often not able to pass along any
economies of scale because there is no assurance that the
option will ever be exercised. This does not mean that
8'
options and IDCs should not be used when future requirements
are unknown, only that DoD activities should be given the
freedom to use a multiple year type contract, if they so
desire. Multiyear contracting was established to fill this
void. However, in actual practice, very few DoD activities
are able to obtain the no-year or multiyear funds required to
use this long-term contract method.
Recommendation # 4 - DoD and other Government activities
should be encouraged to use a best value procurement approach
whenever it makes good business sense to do so. To shift the
emphasis from price competition, it is important that
suppliers recognize that something more than price will go
into the source selection and that there will be an incentive
provided for delivering a better product, even at a higher
price. However, in order to do this, DoD must be able to
adequately quantify non-price factors such as past
performance, as well as to establish variable-incentive
performance specifications (discussed in Chapter II), which
would encourage suppliers to make acceptable cost/performance
tradeoffs.
The Defense Systems Management College 1988-89 Research
Fellows recommend that this could be done in three steps.
They say that the first step in this process would be to
establish an on-line contractor performance history that would
be available to the contracting officer. The elements of the
file should include indices for price, delivery, and reported
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quality problems. Second, the ability to input and access the
files throughout DoD must be established. A partial net will
not be sufficient, since it will fail to provide the objective
information needed eventually to make source selection.
Third, once the network is functioning, quality factors should
be established to adjust bid prices to reflect the associated
value with variations in schedule, quality, or other
performance features. [Ref. l:p. 55]
Recommendation 1 5 - DoD contracting activities should
establish yearly acquisition plans which identify types of
materials and services which lend themselves to being procured
on a long-term basis, as well as to distinguish which types of
long-term contract types, techniques, and methods are to be
used. One possible method that could be used to identify
material and services is a Pareto Analysis.
Not only should input be solicited in-house, but
discussions should be held with suppliers. For example, in
the area of procurement group coding, a supplier may be able
to reveal a commonality in the items of the process which the
buying office would or could not know. In addition to outside
discussions with vendors, it is very important that the people
or offices within DoD, that generate "requirements," also be
involved in the planning process. As with computers, the
output is only as good as the input. This philosophy holds
true in long-term contracting as well. Sound acquisition
85
plans concerning long-tern contracting can only be established
if "requirements" are accurate.
D. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESRARCH
Areas that merit consideration for further study include
(1) establishing a unified Government/private industry
definition for long-term contracts, (2) comprehensively
reviewing the use of long-term contracting by one specific DoD
or other Government activity, and (3) study the link between








This is a letter of introduction and a request for assistance
in a Master's Thesis research project on long-term
contracting.
My name is Greg Breen and I am an active duty Naval Officer in
the U.S. Navy Supply Corps and currently a student at the
Naval Postgraduate School where I am working towards an M.S.
in Acquisition and Contract Management.
My Master's Thesis research is focused on the use of long-term
contracting by both public and private organizations.
Specifically, my research goal is to determine the most common
long-term contracting practices used by private and public
procurement organizations. For the purpose of this thesis,
long-term contracts are considered to be those contracts
(including options) which are written to establish a
buyer/seller relationship longer than traditionally expected
(usually longer than one year) in a normal competitive
environment. This contracting approach is intended to
cultivate a buyer/seller relationship which enhances the level
of product or service quality expected by the buyer and
delivered by the seller.
I request that you take a few minutes to complete the enclosed
survey and return it at your earliest convenience. If you are
unable to answer this survey, please pass it on to someone who
is. All of your responses will remain strictly confidential
if you so choose. The survey results will be used for
academic research analysis on establishing long-term
contractual relationships with suppliers and for recommending
Department of Defense procurement policy changes. I want to









SURVEY OF LONG-TERN CONTRACTING PRACTICES
This survey is designed to solicit information on your use of
long-term contracts. The goal is to determine common long-
term contracting practices used in private and public
procurement organizations. Please take a few minutes to
answer these survey questions. All questions should be
answered from the buyer's perspective. You may remain
anonymous and all answers will remain confidential if you
wish. I would also appreciate a copy of any instructions,
models, or guidance your organization has concerning long-term
contracting (or multiple-year contracting). Thank you for
your assistance.
Date:
Name of your Command, Activity, or Company:
Your name (optional):
Your office or section:
Your position:
Number of years in your current position:
Number of years you have worked in the acquisition field:
Phone number:
1) Do you wish your answers to remain confidential? Yes No
2) May I call you if I have questions? Yes No
3) Briefly describe your organization's primary business:
4) Does your organization use long-term contracts when
purchasing goods and services? Yes No
If you answered no, briefly describe why not?
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IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO QUESTION 4, PLEASE TO2_1 AND RETURN
SURVEY. YOU MAY MAIL IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED. THANK YOU FOP
YOUR ASSISTANCE.
IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 4 IS YES, PLEASE CONTINUE.
5) What percent of the dollar value of your contracts for the
procurement of goods and services are of a long-term nature?
a. 0 to 20% b. 21 to 40% C. 41 to 60%
d. 61 to 80% e. 81 to 100%
6) What percent of the number of your contracts for the
procurement of goods and services are of a long-term nature?
a. 0 to 20% b. 21 to 40% C. 41 to 60%
d. 61 to 80% e. 81 to 100%
7) What is the average length of your long-term contracts?
a. > 1 but < 2 years b. > 2 but < 3 years c. > 3 but < 4
years d. > 4 but < 5 years e. 5 years or more
3) What types of goods and services are you currently
contracting for on a long-term basis and why?
9) What types of goods and services would you like to see
contracted for on a long-term basis and why?
10) What types of contracts and pricing arrangements are you
currently using on your long-term contracts (e.g., FFP, FPIF,
CPIF, IDCs, etc.) and why? In addition, are you using
options?
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11) What types of incentives do you offer your suppliers to
accept long-term contracts (e.g., cost, technical,
performance, delivery, other) and why?
12) What types of incentives do your suppliers ask for with
long-term contracts and why?
13) Do you use any unique contracting arrangements (e.g.,
hybrid contracts), special contracting methods, or special
clauses to reduce risk (e.g., EPAs) with long-term contracts?
Yes No
If yes, briefly describe what they are.
14) Do you face any barriers when using long-term contracts to
procure goods and services? Yes No
If yes, briefly describe what they are and what actions you
are taking to reduce these barriers?
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15) Would you like to see long-term contracts used more often?
Yes No
If yes, briefly describe why?
16) Please briefly describe your most successful long-term
contract and what made it so successful?
THIS IS THE END OF THE SURVEY. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND
EFFORT. PLEASE MAIL SURVEY IN THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED.
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